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A B S T R A C T   
The Covid-19 pandemic is shaking fundamental assumptions about the human life course in societies around the 
world. In this essay, we draw on our collective expertise to illustrate how a life course perspective can make 
critical contributions to understanding the pandemic’s effects on individuals, families, and populations. We 
explore the pandemic’s implications for the organization and experience of life transitions and trajectories within 
and across central domains: health, personal control and planning, social relationships and family, education, 
work and careers, and migration and mobility. We consider both the life course implications of being infected by 
the Covid-19 virus or attached to someone who has; and being affected by the pandemic’s social, economic, 
cultural, and psychological consequences. It is our goal to offer some programmatic observations on which life 
course research and policies can build as the pandemic’s short- and long-term consequences unfold.   
1. Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic has reminded people and societies today of a 
world they forgot, a time when long and relatively healthy lives – even 
life itself – could not be taken for granted. In most western nations, the 
long arc of the twentieth century brought extraordinary gains in human 
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welfare and predictability in the life course. Indeed, in the postwar de-
cades, the stability that had emerged and the scripts that people were 
socialized to follow were described by psychologist Bernice Neugarten 
in 1969 as the “normal, expectable life.” The emergence of the “tripar-
tite” life course, to use sociologist Martin Kohli’s (1986) phrase – with 
education and training on the front end, work in the middle, and 
retirement and leisure at the end – rested on these securities and a 
complex overlay of social institutions and policies that were built around 
it. And although there are major debates about the stability of family life 
in the second half of the century, revolutionary reductions in mortality 
and fertility over the twentieth century meant that family members 
could at least be counted on to co-survive for long stretches of time, and 
that major vulnerabilities and encounters with illness and death would 
come in old age. 
Covid-19 is fundamentally shaking these views of the life course. In 
this article, we show how a life course perspective can make important 
contributions to understanding the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on 
individuals, families, and populations. This is not just about predict-
ability but about the pandemic’s implications for the organization and 
experience of transitions and trajectories within and across life’s central 
domains. Because Covid-19 is a viral pandemic, we begin with its im-
plications for health and then turn to matters of personal control and 
planning, social relationships and family, education, work and careers, 
and migration and mobility. It is our goal to offer some programmatic 
observations on which life course research can build, raising questions, 
generating hypotheses, and steering data collection as the pandemic’s 
short- and long-term consequences unfold. In viewing Covid-19 through 
a life course lens, we are able to identify risks, vulnerabilities, and in-
equalities that may come to individuals and groups, and for this reason, 
we also address some emerging policy concerns and hope to inform 
interventions. 
To anchor the paper, we briefly highlight the most central aspects of 
a life course perspective; its concepts and principles can be found else-
where (e.g., Ben-Shlomo, Cooper, & Kuh, 2016; Bernardi, Huinink, & 
Settersten, 2019; Dannefer, 2020; Elder, Shanahan, & Jennings, 2015; 
Mayer, 2004). A life course perspective on Covid-19 requires attention 
to time and time-related phenomena. At an individual level, time is 
represented by ages and life stages. At a social level, time is reflected in 
family and historical generations. Time-related phenomena include life 
transitions and turning points, and the cumulative nature of life courses, 
viewed as trajectories. These dynamics must also be understood from 
subjective standpoints: that is, how people anticipate or project their 
lives looking forward, and how they review, interpret, and evaluate their 
lives in the present and looking backward. 
Life courses should be analyzed with a dual emphasis on social 
structure and human agency: On one hand, a variety of social contexts 
play powerful roles in shaping the life course and creating both in-
equalities and shared experiences; on the other hand, human beings can 
take actions and make decisions, individually and collectively, that 
affect their life pathways and outcomes. Finally, it is important to 
emphasize interdependencies across multiple levels of analysis (from 
inner-individual to macro levels), multiple life domains (e.g., education, 
work, family), and multiple interrelated people (the “linked lives” of 
family, friends, and acquaintances). 
The future course of the pandemic is unclear.1 We are writing during 
what may be a movement toward the pandemic’s culmination – or 
during what may prove to still be its beginning. We can say with cer-
tainty, however, that Covid-19 is already one of the deadliest infectious 
diseases of the last 100 years, that it has ruptured much of social life, and 
that its threat and disruptions will continue for some time. 
There are two distinct aspects to parse: (1) having Covid-19, or being 
attached to someone who does, and (2) being affected by the social, 
economic, cultural, and psychological consequences of Covid-19. In 
other words, there is an important difference between being infected and 
being affected.2 Both things matter, and the analysis of both is served 
well by a life course perspective. The pandemic is at heart a health 
challenge. As the world awaits a medical solution – particularly a vac-
cine – the most effective remedy has been behavioral: physical 
distancing.3 It is this behavioral remedy that has immediately and 
significantly altered every domain of life – through restricted mobility 
and social interaction, voluntary or involuntary quarantines, lockdowns 
for whole populations, remote working and learning, or loss of work 
altogether. Physical distancing measures arise from a widely recognized 
need and political will to manage the virus, as political decisions and 
specific policies are guided by varying interpretations of the causes of 
the virus’s spread, what should be done, and who is responsible for 
controlling it. 
Two caveats moving forward. First, we are an international group, 
but our view is inherently western. We hope that our observations will 
stimulate questions and hypotheses that can be asked and tested in 
countries other than our own, which are themselves remarkably 
different in the spread of and response to Covid-19 and also in their 
cultural characteristics and institutional arrangements. Second, we 
actively decided to keep the number of citations to a bare minimum. 
Research into the pandemic is rapidly evolving. At this time, it is largely 
focused on the virus itself and matters of public and allied health, and its 
quality is variable and many results unstable. Our goal is not to generate 
a set of guidelines for future research based on a review of science during 
this early stage. Instead, we use a more essayistic form, drawing freely 
on our collective knowledge and experience, with the intention of 
fostering a program of life course research on important questions that 
need to be asked and answered. 
2. Health 
Epidemiological estimates of the Covid-19 virus vary widely due to 
differences in testing and tracing systems. A large percentage of the 
population may eventually be infected, but smaller subsets become ill, 
require hospitalization, need intensive treatment, and die. Knowledge 
about the short-term course of individual infections and effective 
treatments is improving but there is still much to learn about long-term 
health consequences. The health risks of the virus increase strikingly by 
age and are greater for men and for ethnic and migrant groups, which 
are intertwined with social disadvantage. Exposure, infection, and 
quality of health care are directly and indirectly related to occupations 
and living conditions, especially in societies without universal health-
care. For example, workers in some fields like health, food, or transport 
services are more directly exposed to the virus. So are people who live in 
favelas or high-poverty neighborhoods or in cramped living quarters, 
such as labor migrants and refugees in camps. Those in high-stress jobs, 
such as “gig economy” workers, may similarly have greater risks that 
1 It is difficult to know the pandemic’s ultimate course, as knowledge about 
the virus is still accumulating while we are writing and modeling its diffusion is 
extraordinarily complicated. Projected scenarios for individual countries – and 
for the world at large – differ dramatically by a variety of factors, including 
future orders related to migration, mobility, physical distancing, mask use, 
school and work closings and resumption criteria, testing, tracing, hospital 
capacity and equipment, and when an effective vaccination will be developed 
and available. 
2 We originally heard such distinction by Parfait Eloundou-Enyegue when 
acting as panelist in the International Union for the Scientific Study of Pop-
ulation’s (IUSSP) webinar series, Positioning population studies to understand the 
short and long-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, May 20, 2020.  
3 Rather than the commonly used phrase “social distance,” we prefer the term 
“physical distance” or just “distance” because “social distance” is an important 
interactional concept in the social sciences, carrying the implication of hier-
archy and of social groups that are separated from one another in space or 
status. 
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come about indirectly, through the weakening of the immune system. 
An obvious link between the life course and Covid-19 is the strong 
association between old age and the risk of developing a severe form of 
the disease and dying from it. The greater vulnerability of older people 
distinguishes the current pandemic from the Spanish flu, for instance, 
which killed younger individuals at a much higher rate. Yet an epide-
miological or public health perspective on the life course reminds us that 
it is problematic to have too singular a focus on mortality and older 
people. Infection cases that do not result in death can nonetheless have 
long-term consequences for the health and wellbeing of individuals and 
populations of all ages. In addition, infection and post-infection risks are 
not equally distributed across the population and are likely to exacer-
bate existing social inequalities in health. 
A life course perspective emphasizes that the health risks of Covid-19 
depend on prior (and accumulated) biological, psychological, and social 
exposures. Many of the known prognostic health factors of severe re-
sponses to the virus, such as some forms of diabetes, cardiovascular 
disease, and cancer, take years to develop through exposure to pollut-
ants and toxins, poor diet, and lack of exercise. Life course research in 
epidemiology and other fields has shown that major health and disease 
conditions in adulthood and later life often have early developmental 
origins, stemming even from the prenatal period. The underlying risk of 
developing a severe response to Covid-19 can vary greatly between in-
dividuals of the same age, and a life course approach urges analyses 
beyond chronological age as a proxy for risks and instead toward a focus 
on lifetime exposures to the specific risk factors in question. 
Such evidence needs to be taken into account when identifying in-
terventions to mitigate the impact of the virus. A crucial sensitizing 
question is how lifetime exposure to relevant pathogens, such as pre-
vious coronaviruses, or environmental pollution might affect individual 
and cohort susceptibility to Covid-19. For example, the timing of an 
infection intersects with the lifetime trajectory of immune function of 
individuals, including the adaptive immunity acquired in early life and 
immunosenescence (the gradual deterioration of the immune system 
due to normal aging) in older adults – which may increase susceptibility 
to newly-emerging pathogens. Indeed, an individual’s history of risk 
factors is associated with markers of “immune age,” which in turn may 
alter vulnerability to Covid-19. 
The Covid-19 pandemic is an example of a global “macro” environ-
mental event that may challenge the health of birth cohorts, or sub-
groups of those cohorts, across their lives. Health can be affected by 
exposure and susceptibility to the virus and any immediate or delayed 
responses to an infection; government responses to control the virus; 
local, regional, and national health systems; and political systems that to 
varying degrees prioritize economic growth or stability over public 
health – when public health is also good for the economy. 
Individuals will resist, recover, and adapt to the virus in ways that 
may risk or protect their health in the long term. Dynamics related to the 
growth, maintenance, and decline of physical and mental capacities 
should be tracked, as well as the onset and progression of chronic dis-
eases and their preclinical intermediate phases. Evidence is already 
emerging that some survivors of severe Covid-19 infection are taking a 
long time to fully recover or may even endure permanent negative 
health effects. To inform health care and epidemiology, it will be 
important to monitor the long-term health outcomes of those with both 
severe and more moderate responses to the virus. It will be ideal to study 
cohorts whose pre-infection capacities and diseases are known, 
permitting an examination of whether the infection produces a dip and 
recovery in their functional trajectories, a permanent reduction in 
function, and/or an accelerated rate of functional decline. Research also 
needs to account for the psychological consequences of the virus, such as 
the fear and anxiety triggered by it, as well as the uncertainty of living 
with it, for oneself or loved ones, now and in the future. 
In many countries, the pandemic has been accompanied by unprec-
edented lockdowns, the enforcement of physical distancing, and the 
prioritizing of health systems for the care of Covid-19 patients. Research 
is needed to investigate the effects of these responses and their timing on 
short- and long-term health outcomes. The disruption of regular health, 
social care, and emergency services, as well as of informal family care 
not necessarily related to Covid-19, can lead to additional deaths. Less 
preventive care, later diagnoses, and delayed treatments for other ill-
nesses and diseases are affecting population health. 
There are reports that domestic and child abuse, and mental health 
crises, including suicide, have increased during the pandemic – and yet, 
these are likely to be underestimates because clinicians, teachers, and 
other mandatory reporters were not as often interacting with or 
observing women and children, and because reaching out to authorities 
may have been more difficult or risky. Lockdowns have heightened these 
problems, as well as negative health behaviors like physical inactivity 
and alcohol consumption. Lockdowns and requirements for face cover-
ings have in some countries incited much social unrest related to gov-
ernment control and individual behavior that endangers others. 
Lockdowns may be triggering prior, new, or future mental health crises 
to which individuals may be more or less susceptible at different ages or 
life stages. Examples include children developing anxiety in seeing their 
parents distressed or being confronted with rules about dangers they 
cannot see; parents worrying about the health of their parents; and el-
ders worrying about their high risk of infection and death as well as that 
of children or grandchildren in high risk occupations. 
While it is natural to focus on the pandemic’s immediate effects on 
adults, it may be children who suffer the deepest and longest effects. For 
parents in vulnerable groups, there may be a large negative two- 
generation effect of the pandemic, and the trickle-down consequences 
for children may not be revealed for decades. Pandemic conditions are 
likely to harm the health, social, and material wellbeing of children, 
with the poorest children, including homeless children and migrant 
children, hit hardest because both Covid-19 infections and the disrup-
tions caused by the pandemic disproportionately affect disadvantaged 
populations. As children grow older, the pandemic may bring lasting 
scars through factors such as poor nutrition, anxiety, family instability, 
exposure to domestic violence, reduced access to services, or lower 
educational attainment. Taking inspiration from sociologist Glen Elder’s 
(1974) Children of the Great Depression, it will be particularly important 
to observe the pandemic experiences of children in different stages of 
development, and to compare them as they grow older in order to es-
timate the distinct effects of the pandemic on their physical and mental 
health. The shadow of the pandemic may be longer and darker for 
toddlers and preschoolers than for preadolescents and teens, and in-
terventions may be needed years after the pandemic for the former 
group and during or soon after the pandemic for the latter group. 
Health and wellbeing will be indirectly affected by the economic 
decline and high rates of unemployment that have resulted from lock-
downs. Loss of livelihood is already a reality for many individuals and 
families. From a life course perspective, the timing of economic down-
turns in a cohort’s biography can be important in the long-term. For 
example, as we will discuss in a later section, the working careers of 
young adults entering the labor market at such a time may never catch 
up to those of earlier or later cohorts; their continuing disadvantage can 
lead to poorer health outcomes later in life and widening inequalities. 
Similarly, the effects of poverty and instability on children are long- 
lasting and affect learning and other developmental progress, which 
are also tied to later health outcomes. 
3. Personal control and planning 
The pandemic has brought a pervasive sense of being unsettled and 
losing control, making it difficult for individuals to plan, let alone 
optimize or coordinate their plans. Extreme loss of control could lead to 
disengagement from important life goals. Under a common external 
threat, however, individuals might abandon individual agency for col-
lective agency – that is, they might join with others to make social 
change that reduces or removes external constraints to future life course 
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opportunities of whole populations or communities. The global move-
ment to protest systemic racism, which arose after the killing of George 
Floyd at the hands of the police in the U.S., has done just that, creating 
collective agency and a future perspective for those who have been hit 
hardest by the pandemic due to their greater exposure in high-risk jobs, 
inferior access to health care, and other vulnerabilities. Collective 
agency was broadened and strengthened by the recognition that some of 
the pandemic’s social, economic, and health risks are shared by the 
majority. In many countries, there have been increases in volunteering 
or helping others, especially neighbors, in need. Collective responses to 
the pandemic might increase political and civic participation later in the 
life course, with positive effects on an individual’s sense of control, so-
cial integration, and health. 
The greater uncertainty created by the pandemic over the short and 
long term is likely to have somewhat different effects by age, social class, 
gender, and race/ethnicity and be modified by a country’s welfare sys-
tem and the emergency interventions of its institutions. Consider young 
adults on the brink of finishing school and entering the workforce. The 
precarious life conditions of the pandemic might lead young people to 
lower their goals or limit their risk-taking in ways that return to post- 
World War II values of material security and stability that are not 
well-matched to the realities of the labor market in the globalized world 
today. Any disadvantages that young adults suffer in the short term may 
grow over time. In being young, though, they have a longer time horizon 
to adjust or recover. Moreover, they tend to have greater optimism than 
their parents and grandparents. Many youths are exploring life goals and 
choices in connection with a range of “possible selves” and anticipated 
futures, and their lives are not yet as “canalized” by prior choices as 
older adults. These circumstances make it easier to deal with the threat 
to control and planning brought about by the pandemic. 
The disruption to young adults may feel especially heavy, however, 
because they do not yet have a long history of experience or accumu-
lated resources to fall back on as they rework life goals or adapt to life’s 
disappointments. A shrinking labor market takes away opportunities to 
acquire experience or resources which, in turn, can have lifelong scar-
ring effects. Modern cohorts of youth and young adults have been so-
cialized in ways that emphasize their agency and aspirations. The 
pandemic has underscored the reality that life’s possibilities are limited. 
Young people and their parents will naturally blame the pandemic for 
some outcomes that might not have been appreciably different without 
it. Differences by socioeconomic status are likely to be substantial in this 
regard because reduced control and choices already characterize the 
lives of those with few family resources. They may be in “survival mode” 
without long-term backup plans for education, careers, and families. 
Those who are more favorably situated may have a more difficult time 
adjusting their aspirations, but they may also more successfully sur-
mount pandemic challenges, feeling ready sooner to resume striving for 
ambitious goals and be more confident going forward. 
Those well into adulthood are more firmly embedded in family and 
work responsibilities. The pandemic’s toll may be particularly acute for 
them and others who rely on them. Their family statuses leave them with 
fewer choices if they need to reorient themselves in work. They typically 
shoulder responsibilities for supporting young adult children and caring 
for older parents. By midlife, one’s time horizons are growing shorter 
and efforts are focused on building security for the later years. There are 
fewer opportunities to recover from hard times and it is too early to 
retire. In many countries, the safety nets for working-aged adults are 
intentionally temporary and meant to replace only a limited portion of 
lost income. Likewise, midlife adults might more often need to change 
plans to help others, such as extending working life to support younger 
family members who are without jobs. The greater personal, social, and 
economic capital of those in midlife, however, might expand their 
choices or foster a sense of control. But just as these individuals have 
more capital to leverage for coping, they also have more to potentially 
lose. Any control they feel may be precarious, and lower SES individuals 
have fewer resources at their disposal to redirect their lives. 
Older adults, in further contrast, can be expected to focus more on 
the present than the future: immediate joys, uplifting daily events, the 
relationships of close family members and friends – thereby optimizing 
positive and minimizing negative affective experiences. Their shrinking 
time horizon leads them to place a greater premium on goals and ex-
periences that bring meaning. They have the least time to recover 
economically from any market consequences of the pandemic. Their 
economic wellbeing is dependent on public and private pension plans, 
personal assets, and often family members. 
Older people have better emotion regulation, more advanced coping 
strategies, and a broader range of experiences within which to place the 
pandemic experience and judge its relative significance. These judg-
ments will not only be rooted in purely personal experiences, but also in 
their historical location. A nonagenarian today would have been born at 
the start of the Great Depression and a teen by the close of World War II; 
a septuagenarian would have been born in the decade following World 
War II and a young adult during the politically and socially turbulent 
late 1960s and early 1970s. Even in these two examples, both anchored 
in later life, the pandemic will be interpreted through different historical 
lenses. More generally, older generations might, by virtue of their 
experience, take the perspective that “this, too, will pass” or recognize 
that there are many things in life people do not get to decide or that 
cannot be controlled. These different ways of understanding the world 
and seeing life will be meaningful intergenerationally, especially in 
families, which are natural meeting places for different historical gen-
erations. When three or more generations are assembled together, 
families contain a patchwork of historical experiences that can span 
even a century. Given the age segregation of many social environments 
today, families are the key forum for making sense of history. 
In both families and societies, these generational differences in 
worldviews can be both sources of tension and bridges to solidarity. 
Amid Covid-19, there have been reports that ageism has been on the rise, 
on the older end perhaps driven by blame for lockdown measures that 
have brought so much disruption or of health system overload, and on 
the younger end perhaps driven by resentment of teens and young adults 
who have disregarded protective measures based on their belief that 
they are not at risk of illness or death. 
For older adults we can again expect socioeconomic differences in 
the effects of the pandemic. In many countries, the wealth (versus in-
come) of older people is much greater than those of younger adult ages, 
but so are differences among older people, reflecting advantages and 
disadvantages that have accumulated across the life course. Poor and 
minority elders, at least in countries like the U.S., often live in dense and 
underserved communities or in badly run and understaffed nursing 
homes, where they are significantly exposed to infection risks and die 
under dreadful circumstances. These older adults are likely to feel sig-
nificant loss of control and despair. Later life is a highly precarious 
period: control capacity and self-efficacy are more possible when health, 
wealth, and social relationships are intact, but weaken as these resources 
come undone. 
An individual’s attempts to adapt to the crisis will be shaped by their 
personality characteristics and worldviews. Caspi and Moffitt (1993) 
argue that times of crisis accentuate the role of personality in shaping 
individual responses and thus the long-term sequelae for the life course. 
Personality characteristics will therefore interact with the pandemic in 
ways that uniquely shape and increase individual differences in short- 
and long-term outcomes. For example, those who are highly confident 
and engaged in pursuing ambitious goals might approach a lockdown 
with resilience and inventiveness, finding new ways and means to make 
progress under the changed circumstances. Those who are less confident 
or engaged with their own prospects may suffer declines in goal ex-
pectations and social or cognitive functioning. Again, social inequality 
will be important in determining whether someone can afford to 
embrace ambitious and risky goal engagement during a societal crisis. 
With respect to planning and control, men may be more shaken than 
women by the lack of predictability created by the pandemic. Men’s 
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lives have traditionally been more linear in orientation and clockwork, 
and women’s lives have traditionally been more contingent, whether in 
being more "at the will of the body," to use Arthur Frank’s (1991) phrase, 
with respect to biological clocks and cycles related to reproduction or in 
having greater interdependencies stemming from family roles and 
relationships. 
4. Social relationships and family 
The immediate shock of the pandemic has shaken the relations 
among people. Mobility restrictions created by physical distancing 
measures have left people painfully aware of how much their wellbeing 
is linked to others and how much they take for granted the ability to be 
with others. Social integration likely makes a difference in people’s 
capacity to cope during the pandemic, but the distancing measures also 
reveal and alter the quality of relationships. This also poses an inter-
esting dilemma: feelings of loneliness affect the immune system, but 
interacting in the population could result in an infectious disease. The 
pandemic has not only severely impaired the ability of people to be in 
close physical face-to-face interaction with other humans, this has in 
turn blocked the intense human need for touch, preventing hugging and 
constraining other physical displays of affection and connection. Despite 
the explosion of electronically-mediated interaction in recent decades, it 
is not clear what another major shift from in-person interaction – “being 
alone together” during the pandemic – means for the maintenance and 
quality of relationships and deep interpersonal connection. 
The regulation of social life under the pandemic has had a profound 
effect on the experience of life transitions. In the Covid-19 era, people 
have been unable to share in the social and cultural aspects of life’s most 
important moments: births, birthdays, graduations, engagements, mar-
riages, new jobs, retirements, deaths. There have been many innovative 
examples of involving others in these passages, especially via video- 
calling, drive-ins or drive-bys, or the creative redesign of space to 
meet physical distancing requirements. Research needs to examine the 
short- and long-term consequences of reducing, denying, or altering the 
communal experience of key life-course transitions. 
The transition to parenthood has been especially affected by 
pandemic measures. Hospitals and clinics have not allowed others to 
accompany mothers during labor, delivery, and recovery. The post-
partum period of assistance from family and friends has been limited by 
travel restrictions and the at-risk status of potential family assistants (e. 
g., older parents). This may create feelings of isolation and despair. 
Some new parents, on the other hand, might appreciate the fact that the 
social world is kept at bay to foster their private time and bonding. 
Parents of young children might similarly appreciate the extra family 
time. Fathers may be more present and involved in family life, especially 
in contexts without paternal leave. 
We may begin to observe pandemic-era changes in the timing, or 
anticipated timing, of family transitions, such as the postponement of 
cohabitations, marriages, or fertility, or accelerated separations and 
divorces – due to any number of factors related to resources, markets, 
and uncertainties. It will be important to examine whether such 
changes, should they emerge, are temporary disruptions to the schedule 
for family transitions or longer-term trends that alter it in a more per-
manent fashion. In aggregate, these changes will affect population 
structure and dynamics, and larger societal consequences might include 
the intensification of delays in the transition to adulthood and growing 
rates of singlehood, childlessness, and population aging. 
The pandemic and physical distancing have the potential for im-
mediate and long-term effects on young children’s attachment. Infants, 
toddlers, and preschoolers are extremely sensitive to changes in their 
environments but do not fully understand them. When quarantines 
began, there was great anxiety about the virus entering and spreading 
through the household and families struggled with how to safely express 
physical affection. In a lockdown, families are less worried because they 
are limiting contact with the outside world – except, of course, for those 
working in essential services and those with household members with 
vulnerable health. With reopenings, parents again worry about the virus 
coming into the household. Worries are likely greater for those with 
teenage children, who may feel immune to the virus; and those with 
young children, who are not as able to manage physical distancing. 
When schools are closed, children and teens are unable to interact in 
person with friends. For teens, especially, peer groups and friendships 
are central to exploring identities. They also desire to be in large groups, 
dense settings, and on the move. Of course, digital media permitted 
continuity in friendships and a lifeline to others. But lockdowns and 
school closures generate further isolation among young people who are 
socially marginalized in any number of ways. For some teens and young 
adults, the expression of their identities is stifled or not permitted at 
home; for example, there are reports of increased homelessness among 
LGBTQ youth. For teens and adults seeking intimate relationships, the 
pandemic has restricted in-person possibilities for dating and sex. There 
are alternative modes for these pursuits, such as online platforms, but 
also questions about the emotional quality, need fulfillment, and sur-
vival of these relationships. 
The pandemic removed many adults from their workplaces and 
primary daily networks, forcing them to collaborate and sustain con-
nections remotely. Increased work at home can colonize family life. This 
problem has several dimensions, including the fact that it is employers 
who benefit most when employees use their private time, space, and 
other personal and relational resources to accomplish their work. It also 
reinforces or increases inequality due to differences in employees’ per-
sonal resources and home situations that make it more or less difficult to 
work remotely. Remote work can also increase stress through instant 
availability, high demands, the press of care for children and infirm 
relatives, and the blurring of work and nonwork boundaries. 
Older people are more vulnerable socially because they are not 
permitted to be or are fearful of being with others, given their greater 
health risks, and because serious illness and death are more prevalent in 
their networks, triggering dynamics of loss. Those who live alone 
experience the greatest risk of isolation. Widowers are especially 
vulnerable, as older men are not as embedded in family and social 
networks and longstanding relationships. Older people who are forced 
to shelter in place may feel a deep loss of independence. Those strug-
gling with illnesses at home or in care environments may not get the 
support they need – or, especially for older women, give others the 
support they would like to give, such as grandchildren or sick relatives. 
Older people are dying alone or saying goodbyes through plastic parti-
tions or glass windows, phones, and computers. 
Enforced lockdowns have generated more intensive family interac-
tion and increased the interdependence of family members. Households 
were more crowded at all hours due to unemployment or work from 
home, the need for home meals, lack of childcare, and responsibility for 
children’s education when schools are closed, or limited care or health 
services, placing greater strain on women and mothers in particular. Job 
loss and economic hardship have led some households to “double up” in 
an effort to conserve resources or accommodate those who could not pay 
mortgages or rent or were evicted. These conditions have undermined 
relationships. Families with children or other members with special 
needs have suffered from the withdrawal of support services. Partner-
ships that were vulnerable before the pandemic seem more likely to 
dissolve thereafter. Family structure also made a difference in the ability 
of families to cope with economic challenges. Lone parents with young 
children, who are often economically and psychologically more 
vulnerable, struggled not only to make ends meet but also to manage the 
organizational challenges of the pandemic. Because these parents are 
more likely to be mothers, the burden of the pandemic is again shoul-
dered by women. And yet, some families seem to be closer and more 
connected, prioritizing their relationships and settling into slower 
rhythms of family life. Amid the pandemic, the normal use of video- 
calling in multi-local families diffused to all kinds of families to bring 
together multiple generations and extended families in ways they did 
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not before, and to better incorporate both very old and very young 
members. 
In families where someone has contracted the virus, members may be 
thrust into caregiving roles to meet immediate, recovery, or long-term 
needs. In later life, a particularly painful role is that of outliving a 
spouse or an older adult child who has died of Covid-19. A pandemic like 
Covid-19 dramatically increases the mortality that would normally 
occur in a particular period. At present, mortality risks remain most 
concentrated among older people, but these losses nonetheless ripple 
through family networks as the virus hastens the deaths of parents and 
grandparents. 
5. Education and training 
A life course perspective on education and training emphasizes the 
importance of transitions across levels in the process of educational 
attainment as well as from school to training and from school to work. 
Whether these are accomplished “on-time” or “off-time” often has major 
implications for the subsequent life course, inviting a focus on the long- 
term consequences of transitions that occurred during the pandemic. 
The immediate disruption to students of all ages was swift and acute, 
with virtually no time for teachers or students to prepare. It is difficult to 
know how long these challenges will last and what toll they will take on 
students’ learning or academic achievement. It is again foreseeable that 
effects are likely to vary by the ages and social positions of students, and 
by how educational systems are organized. For elementary and sec-
ondary school students, the content and quality of the learning experi-
ence shifted from school to home. In the new homeschooling 
environment, some children are well equipped with computers, fast 
internet access, and a quiet place to study, whereas others are in 
cramped quarters, without the resources or wherewithal to accomplish 
distance learning. Parents who are able to work remotely are at least 
somewhat more available to monitor their children’s distance learning, 
although parents’ confidence and ability to help will vary by their 
resourcefulness and educational levels. Remote learning (and working) 
has also exposed status differences across students (and employees), as 
video connections put people’s home lives and living conditions on 
display. 
Educational systems vary in the extent to which they select and track 
students and allow students to switch tracks. Systems that offer more 
structured educational pathways and curricula may more easily allow 
students to follow and complete their education, but if these are 
accompanied by fewer opportunities to change course, they can lead to 
unsuccessful transitions. Educational systems that explicitly sort pupils 
into different tracks at young ages create more inequality in educational 
outcomes than more comprehensive systems. It is plausible that the 
pandemic will heighten these inequalities, both because parents with 
greater resources are better able to support their children’s learning and 
because increased uncertainty may decrease students’ willingness to 
pursue higher education – and parents’ willingness to pay for it, or to 
pay as much for it, in countries where the private costs of college are 
high. Some youth have had to scale back their educational aspirations, 
staying close to home or planning a “gap year” when faced with the 
likelihood of continued remote learning (preventing a “true” college 
experience) or possible infections in group living and large in-person 
classes. 
Delayed educational transitions may have indirect effects on the life 
course by increasing the size of later graduating cohorts, resembling 
something like a baby boom. The life chances of these students would be 
altered by their position in an unusually large cohort of graduates 
simultaneously navigating labor, housing, and relationship markets in 
early adulthood – and competing with those who were already in the 
labor market but are still trying to recover. 
The transition from school to work is becoming more precarious with 
the now-historic unemployment and underemployment rates, business 
closings, and organizational downsizing. Those who are completing 
degrees amid these conditions seem most likely to be negatively 
affected; studies of long-term earnings for those entering the workforce 
in prior recessions demonstrated negative effects throughout their 
occupational careers. 
This juncture is strongly governed by the link between educational 
and labor market institutions as well as welfare states. Generally, the 
transition to work has been smoothest in countries such as Germany and 
Switzerland, which have strong links between education and the labor 
market due to their extensive vocational training and apprenticeship 
programs. The Covid-19 crisis can disrupt the transition to work if 
companies scale back apprenticeships, bringing potential long-term 
consequences for the cohort entering the labor market during the 
crisis. The mechanisms disrupting the transition can take different forms 
in countries like the U.S. and U.K., which offer little institutional support 
for this transition, and where students have always had to rely on net-
works of family and friends, prior employers, or college career centers to 
find jobs. Finally, in Southern European countries with already high 
youth unemployment, youth are likely to experience an amplification of 
existing delays in leaving home and entering first jobs as part of an 
ongoing delay in the transition to adulthood more generally. 
The pandemic will also affect transitions back to education or 
training in adulthood. Millions of displaced workers will require re- 
training, skill upgrading, and new degrees, enabling movement into 
growth sectors (e.g., health care, digital technology). The pandemic has 
brought growing opportunities for the expansion of online learning, 
potentially from a greater range of providers, creating more flexibility to 
manage education alongside work and family commitments and the 
possibility of “lifelong learning” – a principle that many educational 
systems have been very slow to integrate into their functioning up to 
now. Even then, the chances of attending and completing further edu-
cation – whether degrees, certificates, or shorter training – depend on 
adults’ work and family commitments. In the pandemic, disruption to 
one’s own or a spouse’s employment, or the onset of illness for a family 
member, may be just enough to block or require withdrawal from ed-
ucation or training. Furthermore, it has been clear for some time that the 
rate of knowledge growth and the changing nature and even continued 
existence of many jobs requires greater educational attainment or 
ongoing training. There has been some resistance to acknowledging and 
adapting to this fact. The pandemic has brought a seismic shift in the use 
of electronics, the internet, and remote learning in ways that could 
create more openness and responsiveness to the need for ongoing edu-
cation and training over the life course. 
6. Work and careers 
The pandemic and the policies used to combat it have had immediate 
labor market consequences. Unemployment has increased exponen-
tially. Apart from analyzing the distribution of unemployment risks 
across age groups – as well as for different subgroups defined by gender, 
race, and nativity – life course researchers will be particularly interested 
in tracing how the short-term consequences of the pandemic’s economic 
crisis are translated into long-term effects. Prior research on economic 
recessions and depressions repeatedly demonstrates that earlier unem-
ployment begets later unemployment and leaves a lasting mark on in-
come. For some, unemployment is a short-lived experience, while for 
others it becomes the starting point of a longer-term process of labor 
market exclusion. The effects of unemployment on various aspects of 
individual and family wellbeing are most severe when it is prolonged. 
One might expect to find the strongest long-term effects for the 
cohort of graduates whose immediate transition from school to work is 
hampered by the pandemic, particularly if it lasts a long time. This could 
result in a kind of “lost generation” with shrinking opportunities in 
employment and truncated career and family formation, which would in 
turn have lifelong consequences. Note, however, that the current 
evolving economic crisis can add “insult to injury” for those cohorts now 
in their thirties who were already penalized a decade ago when they 
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entered the job market during the financial crisis (or “Great Recession”) 
that began in 2008, most of whom now have the additional economic 
demands of parenthood. 
The effects of the pandemic on work and careers are sure to be 
moderated by existing national support systems, such as the unem-
ployment and social benefit systems, labor market regulations, and 
family policies; by individual and community resources; and by existing 
gender, race and other inequities. Work organizations also play a role: 
The characteristics of pension systems, and their interactions with labor 
market institutions, shape pathways to retirement and thus affect older 
and younger cohorts of workers alike. With respect to individual re-
sources, one wonders about the influence of social networks and espe-
cially of “weak ties” and “bridging ties,” which have been shown to be 
powerful in generating occupation and employment opportunities. For 
many people, it would seem that during the pandemic strong ties remain 
strong, as family members and friends stay in touch, if sometimes 
inconveniently (e.g., with video-call programs). However, it is impor-
tant to ask whether the pandemic might threaten, or perhaps even 
strengthen, weak or bridging ties, and what effects this might have not 
only on work and careers but on access to and exchanges of support to 
meet other needs as well. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis of the pandemic, at least its early 
phase, has affected economic sectors differently. Given how strongly 
education and occupational sectors are intertwined with occupational 
segregation, the sector-specific consequences of the crisis will shape 
career inequalities. Self-employed and temporary workers are likely to 
be more affected in their career options than those with permanent 
contracts. Those in low-wage service sectors have been especially hard 
hit with the reduction of restaurant meals, catering, travel, or enter-
tainment. Those in office-based service jobs, such as custodians and 
cafeteria workers, are more likely to permanently lose employment as 
work at home continues and jobs are replaced by automated technolo-
gies and artificial intelligence. These types of workers, who were in low- 
pay jobs before the pandemic, now face a severe lack of employment, 
reduction of income, and reliance on sometimes inadequate income 
support systems. However, the pandemic has highlighted the role of 
“essential” workers, many of whom are employed in less prestigious and 
poorly paid jobs, such as caring, transport, cleaning, and check-out staff. 
Lockdowns, school closures, and care responsibilities associated with 
the pandemic can be expected to significantly and negatively impact 
women’s employment and careers. Women are more often found in 
lower-paid, less secure, or part-time and nonstandard work, and in more 
vulnerable sectors of the labor market. Women are more likely to be 
responsible for providing immediate and lingering care to family 
members with Covid-19, which will take a toll on their careers. This is 
unusual, given that in a recession unemployment generally hits men 
harder than women because more men work in industries that are 
closely tied to economic cycles, such as construction and manufacturing. 
Women, conversely, are more dominant in industries not tied to such 
cycles, such as healthcare and education. However, this time other 
factors played major roles. Pandemic-based needs may prompt couples 
to revert to a more gendered division of labor, eroding progress toward 
gender equality. At the same time, it is possible that the pandemic-based 
crises in schools, care settings, and at home will raise the visibility and 
value of women’s work. 
It is important to examine the career effects of contracting the virus 
or of needing to provide care to those who have. A large literature has 
documented that individuals’ poor health has negative effects on labor 
market attachment and other career outcomes. Although a minority of 
those infected develop a serious form of Covid-19, those who do may 
suffer serious long-term health effects and an infection may be a turning 
point in workers’ careers. Given the spread and possible courses of the 
virus, there are significant implications for the health capital of the 
workforce. 
The effects of a Covid-19 infection on careers should be sensitive to 
the principle of timing and therefore vary by age. Although younger 
workers are unlikely to have a serious version of the disease, those who 
do seem likely to experience cumulative disadvantages due to loss of 
training, experience, and promotions. At the population level, though, 
the labor market effects of Covid-19 should be larger among older 
workers, who are more likely to have a serious response to the virus or to 
have other aspects of health compromised by the course of their 
infection. 
There are possible interactions to examine between age- and domain- 
specific effects and work and health outcomes. Young people are at 
lower risk of being infected than older adults, but they are at greater risk 
of becoming unemployed than already established workers. Older 
workers, particularly those in the retirement bracket, are more prone to 
infection but might be better protected economically, especially in 
countries with strong labor unions – if their pension funds are not eroded 
by the evolving economic crisis. Older workers’ greater risk of con-
tracting the virus, and its greater health impacts, might increase 
discrimination in the (re)hiring of older workers and push them into 
retirement prematurely. 
7. Migration and mobility 
Many of the immediate effects of the pandemic resulted from the 
need to control it by restricting mobility and migration – from move-
ment across international borders down to movement within spaces of 
everyday life. Such constraints interfere in many ways with life course 
opportunities and outcomes of individuals and families. Early re-
strictions on day-to-day mobility and travel were severe, with millions of 
people confined to their homes, institutions, or destinations. The closing 
of borders or the selective regulation of international travel alters many 
kinds of migration, including labor migration, family-related migration, 
refugee migration, student migration, and amenity migration. Not only 
has initial migration been severely restricted, but many of those who had 
migrated before the pandemic continue to be stranded and cannot get 
back to their origin points. This is particularly problematic for those who 
have been laid off, have limited social protections or are without in-
come, and cannot afford travel. 
Short- and long-term consequences of restrictions on migration are 
also likely to fall on faraway family members of international migrants, 
including children and elderly “left behind” in the seasonal migration of 
women and men in care or agricultural sectors, and whose quality of life 
depends on that work. In addition, when women in the highly feminized 
migrant care workforce across the globe cannot work and provide a 
major source of family income, gender equality and the status of women 
are undermined. 
Although seemingly less extreme by comparison, internal migration 
and residential mobility over shorter distances nonetheless affects life 
course opportunities and outcomes. It can interfere with the ability to 
move in order to find better jobs or schools, begin university, more easily 
manage work and family life, or give or get formal or informal care. It 
has been difficult to get elders into nursing homes or other care in-
stitutions, which have been a hotbed of virus transmission. Moving 
forward, people may be afraid to seek necessary care in these environ-
ments and try to “age in place” as long as possible. 
The need for internal migration will increasingly be prompted by 
economic hardship and an inability to afford rent or mortgage payments, 
forcing families or individuals to downsize and move into less desirable 
areas with reduced access to health, education, and transport services. 
Primary assets stored in homeownership may plummet if housing mar-
kets cool down, especially in densely populated cities or tourist desti-
nations that have traditionally had greatest demand and inflated real 
estate values. The rise in unemployment will undoubtedly lower de-
mand for labor migrants and create a corresponding decline in both 
internal and international migration. 
Easy and affordable access to travel may become even more selective 
in the wake of Covid-19, especially through the limited supply and 
regulation of public transport and reluctance to use it. This will affect the 
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direct costs of moving as a strategy to improve life chances. More 
fundamentally, new surges in the pandemic will reduce the possibility of 
back-and-forth travel after a move. People may be especially hesitant to 
move internationally or over long distances, thus reducing the global-
ization of labor markets. Worry about travel might inhibit even shorter- 
distance moves from family and create a tendency to live closer to work, 
or to work from home altogether. Even after the virus is under control, 
these changes in perspectives, norms, and practices may remain for 
many years to come. 
Long-term life course consequences are likely to be particularly 
strong for those who were at a critical turning point in their lives when 
the pandemic hit, and whose lives took a different turn than envisaged 
before the crisis. Important examples are entry into post-secondary ed-
ucation and the labor market. These transitions mainly take place at 
young adult ages – prime ages of migration and mobility. As a conse-
quence of the crisis, options for long-distance career moves or education 
abroad may not only be postponed, but also foregone. This could create 
disadvantages that cannot be undone later in life, or that can be over-
come only with difficulty. In the very worst case, lives could be lost 
owing to a lack of options to find refuge from oppression, climate 
change, or virus outbreaks following from anti-immigration policies. 
Those in lower socio-economic strata already tend to be less mobile, but 
their mobility is likely to be even more constrained because of their 
economic standing and the costs associated with moving. 
8. Life course policies 
It will take several decades to reveal the life course consequences of 
policies meant to control the pandemic through public health practices 
and interventions. Such policies have modified people’s attachment to 
and the boundaries between life domains, as well as the in-
terdependencies between people. Lockdown measures, in particular, 
reduced institutional and organizational boundaries and created sig-
nificant spillovers as homes became the hub of education, work, and 
family life. The physical separation of people reduced the potential for 
typical patterns of social exchange and support. Of special concern are 
those individuals with few social connections or who live alone, espe-
cially older people whose health was already compromised or might be 
compromised amid Covid-19. For those in unhealthy relationships or 
resource-deprived networks, dependence rather than isolation is likely 
to be the major issue through which the pandemic carries some of its 
negative consequences, as the increase in domestic violence against 
women and children in some countries has shown. Because care work is 
relatively inflexible, unlikely to follow predictable rhythms, and heavily 
gendered, it is women who especially shoulder the burden of the 
pandemic at home. 
Pandemic-related measures have not only modified the organization 
of life for the initial months of the emergency phase, but also the 
graduated phases of resumption. These modifications are likely to bring 
many longer-term consequences for the life course. The pandemic has 
unveiled socioeconomic, ethnic/racial, and gender inequalities that are 
magnified by existing income and health inequalities. Distinct policy 
contexts related to the economy and work, education, and health will be 
particularly central in fostering or hindering recovery and the redistri-
bution of resources toward the most vulnerable. Public policy systems 
that emphasize individual responsibility and reliance on private (family) 
support over public support have deepened the effects of the crisis for 
the most vulnerable, whether through insecurities related to food, 
housing, employment conditions, or health insurance. 
Even in more progressive welfare states, students, the self-employed, 
and undocumented immigrants have often been excluded from gov-
ernment schemes to address resources lost during the Covid-19 crisis. 
These groups have had few options for financial assistance, other than 
what family members might provide. It is unclear whether policies 
designed for the general public will be effective in reaching and pro-
tecting those who are not embedded in social relationships or networks 
that might help offset the serious consequences of the pandemic, 
whether loss of employment, income or hope. Policies must be designed 
to protect children, including dependent young adults, from the risks of 
poverty and other family hardships. 
The pandemic has significant implications for educational policy and 
inequalities among children, youth, and young adults. The revenues for 
schools are falling as municipalities and regional governments cope with 
the immediate health and economic effects of the pandemic. Increasing 
aid for public education is a tough sell when there are other competing 
critical needs (e.g., hospitals, homeless shelters). During the pandemic, 
schools are facing even greater costs related to supplies, equipment, 
space, and personnel. To reduce inequalities, schools have to provide 
computers or tablets and subsidies for internet access. If nothing is done 
to augment educational budgets, the digital divide among parents will 
have long-term implications for the life courses of children and adoles-
cents. Moreover, if governments pull back on funding higher education, 
institutions will be forced to raise tuition, which occurred during the 
Great Recession. Programs are needed to enable youth with limited re-
sources to attend college and to open up higher education for a possible 
wave of school-returners after an unhappy period of job search, unem-
ployment, or underemployment. An alternative is to make online 
courses a more viable alternative to traditional forms of education 
provision. 
Moreover, policies are needed to smooth the transition between 
school and work. When students can realistically foresee a future job, 
they will have greater motivation to complete their educational pro-
grams, persist when challenges threaten their progress, and attain 
sought-after educational credentials. There is also a need to reintegrate 
and support the economic production sector through active labor market 
policies promoting employment, such as those investing in retaining, 
and policies contrasting labor shortages due to restricted seasonal mo-
bilities and longer-term migration flows. Environmental, cultural, and 
behavioral changes triggered by the pandemic may also have positive 
outcomes for population health and wellbeing in the longer-term, for 
example by improving individual health behaviors; decreasing tolerance 
for rising social inequalities; heightening informal social support and 
collective solidarity; making clear how government and programs that 
work well are necessary for everyone’s wellbeing; and increasing sup-
port for a “one health” approach that views the health of people, ani-
mals, and the environment as interconnected. 
Thus, the pandemic might increase support for social protections 
throughout the life course. But the economic burden created by the 
policies to control the pandemic might also produce a backlash less 
supportive of social programs and major redistributive policies. In 
addition, concerns with people’s mobility and the diffusion of the virus 
may nourish nationalism and xenophobic attitudes, an upsurge in anti- 
immigration policies, or resistance to reopening borders to certain 
populations. 
These early months of the pandemic have served as a reminder that 
wellbeing and quality of life are not only about economic resources, and 
that a purely medical or epidemiological perspective in policy devel-
opment is insufficient. Well being and quality of life are to a great degree 
dependent on the boundaries and balance between work and private life, 
caring social relationships, good mental health,comfortable living ar-
rangements, trust in politics and one another, and well-functioning so-
cial institutions and governments. The pandemic has also served as a 
reminder that health and wellbeing are not only individual character-
istics but public goods that matter for the welfare and functioning of 
whole communities and populations. 
Because most welfare-state schemes are designed to repair or 
normalize disrupted life courses, the degree to which welfare states are 
strengthened or weakened in the wake of the pandemic and its economic 
consequences will be a major source of life course stability, change, and 
precariousness. The same applies to new forms of social investment in 
welfare programs, including health insurance. In countries with loose- 
knit welfare systems, the prospect of large-scale social decline should 
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favor the reinforcement of the social safety net, especially with a view to 
older unemployed or economically-dependent persons who are threat-
ened by the loss of support. 
Covid-19 has opened a window to rethink current institutions and 
policies with the life course in mind. Many institutions have responded 
to the pandemic with greater flexibility in normal practices and policies, 
openness to innovation, and more permissiveness and compassion to-
ward the people learning, working, and living in those institutions. The 
pandemic has brought lessons in how systems might be reworked ho-
listically to foster continuity. For example, greater awareness of the 
interdependencies across life domains creates an opportunity to find 
alternative and possibly long-term solutions to curbing work-family 
conflicts; greater awareness of the interdependencies across in-
dividuals creates an opportunity to develop more flexible and sustain-
able forms of interaction and cooperation. The pandemic has also raised 
awareness that social institutions and policies reproduce and even 
deepen inequalities, bringing lessons in how systems can be redesigned 
to address persistent disadvantages associated with gender, race, age, 
social class, and other social categories. 
9. Life course data 
The research community was quick to react to the spread of Covid-19 
and the unprecedented measures used to curtail it by launching 
numerous data collection efforts, not only in the health sciences but also 
in the behavioral and social sciences. As we have emphasized, the life 
course approach can fertilize research on the health, psychological, and 
social risks of Covid-19 and the broader crisis, as well as investigations 
of their long-term consequences. It is important that data collection ef-
forts do not become compartmentalized by discipline but remain broad 
and recognize the multiple facets of the pandemic. Data will need to be 
gathered years after the pandemic to examine its various long-term 
consequences. Life course researchers should remain active in guaran-
teeing expansive long-term data collection efforts of a variety of issues 
beyond, but also including, health. 
Due to the centrality of time and time-related phenomena in life 
course research, longitudinal data will naturally be the most important 
data resource on the Covid-19 pandemic. Several established longitu-
dinal studies that rely on national panel and cohort data are already 
collecting or planning to collect modules or items specific to and during 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Life course researchers emphasize how earlier 
life experiences – such as prenatal and early childhood health, childhood 
conditions, unemployment experiences, cumulative exposure to adverse 
health or other conditions, as well as exposure to previous historical 
events – create risk and shape the effects of subsequent experiences on 
individuals and entire cohorts. Therefore, the greatest data gains will be 
made by building on ongoing longitudinal projects that link information 
on life before Covid-19 to experiences during and specific to the 
pandemic. These projects have the additional advantage of building 
upon existing sampling frames and research organizations, which can 
add to their flexibility in collecting new data during the pandemic. 
Inserting a supplementary module or items on Covid-19 experiences at 
regular intervals will help adapt existing longitudinal studies to this new 
topic. Ad hoc point-in-time studies that generate data using any variety 
of methods might provide relevant data even more rapidly, but these 
will often lack longitudinal depth (except for information that can 
reliably be gathered retrospectively) and the means to follow their 
pandemic samples over time. 
Next to time and time-related phenomena, we have emphasized the 
distinction between being infected and affected by the new coronavirus, 
as well as the importance of social structure and context, and agency and 
subjectivity. Understanding how exposure to risk factors over the life 
course affect health during the pandemic requires reliable information 
on whether one has been infected as well as the severity of the disease 
that followed. Such data also are needed to analyze the effects of having 
been ill from Covid-19. Ideally, infections would be measured using 
reliable biomarkers. Similarly, longitudinal data projects would prefer-
ably collect other biological data relevant to understanding Covid-19 
infections and their consequences, including data on predisposing 
health conditions and genetic data. 
As we have emphasized, Covid-19 infections affect not only those 
who are infected but also family members and others in close vicinity. 
Likewise, because the coronavirus spreads through social networks, 
becoming infected depends on who one lives and interacts with. Both 
call for data on the “linked lives” of Covid-19. These data, as well as data 
on other ways in which the pandemic has affected family lives and social 
relationships, will enrich many existing projects which have tradition-
ally acknowledged the importance of households and family lives in 
their longitudinal data collection efforts. 
Social context and structure will feature in many life course analyses 
of the Covid-19 pandemic. Life course researchers have for a long time 
underscored the significance of institutions and policies in shaping life 
transitions and trajectories, and the pandemic has made their roles ever 
more visible. Country comparisons have been the main analytical tool 
for analyses on the importance of macro-level factors and the quick 
emergence of internationally coordinated longitudinal data collection 
efforts is particularly welcome. However, a feature of the Covid-19 
pandemic has been the clustering of infections in regions, cities, or 
smaller contexts such as workplaces, places of worship, or neighbor-
hoods. Although many policies until now have been implemented 
regionally or nationally, policies are becoming more targeted with 
further outbreaks. 
This clustering means that people are differently exposed and 
affected depending on where they live, work, and socialize. This varia-
tion gives rise to natural experiments that should be exploited to design 
studies for analyzing the effects of exposure to the virus on the one hand, 
and physical distancing, school and workplace closures, and other 
measures that emerged in response to Covid-19 on the other. This will 
require geographically and contextually granular data. This granularity 
creates data size demands that may not always be met with surveys or 
other common types of data. Administrative data and national registries 
will be valuable due to their sheer size for many research questions 
regarding family dynamics, work and careers, and health outcomes, but 
not for questions regarding psychological wellbeing and life plans and 
perceptions, which are not solicited in such data. 
One of the major consequences of the pandemic is that it shattered 
the sense of predictability in life. Similarly, being infected and affected 
by the pandemic can shape how people perceive their life histories and 
identities. An understanding of these and other subjective-temporal 
features of the pandemic requires their measurement in the context of 
broader data collection efforts. Data should similarly be collected on 
individuals’ agency during the pandemic, for instance on compliance 
with norms of physical distancing and other measures for health pro-
tection or on the predictors of individual resilience. 
Finally, qualitative data, possibly longitudinal as well, are necessary 
for revealing the processes and mechanisms that link the pandemic to 
life course outcomes. These data are best suited for uncovering the 
breadth and diversity of individual situations and subjective responses 
to the threat of illness and public health restrictions meant to contain it. 
For example, individual interpretations of their experiences of quaran-
tine, alterations in their sense of control, and efforts to exercise agency 
and maintain a sense of wellbeing in the face of the pandemic are varied 
and nuanced and not well assessed by fixed-choice survey questions. 
Qualitative approaches are also necessary to make visible the pandemic 
experiences of young children and members of hard-to-reach and 
vulnerable populations, such as women who are victims of abuse and 
violence. 
10. Concluding thoughts 
Covid-19 represents a massive global crisis that behavioral and social 
scientists must study from a life course perspective. The pandemic 
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creates a pressing need and unique laboratory to analyze how institu-
tional structures, sociodemographic composition, types of stratification, 
and other dimensions of societal differentiation and regulation generate 
different responses to a common threatening external shock – and, in 
turn, how those responses alter the organization and experience of the 
life course in a given society. As the pandemic unfolds, we must continue 
to monitor which societal changes will be temporary and which will be 
longer-lasting and even lead to permanent systemic change. A life course 
perspective provides a powerful lens for understanding these complex 
interdependencies over time. 
In emphasizing time, a life course perspective invites diachronic 
(time-based) rather than synchronic (point-in-time) comparisons. The 
effects of the pandemic will likely depend on timing – that is, on ages or 
life stages that are more or less vulnerable or sensitive to certain types of 
effects. The most severe health risks of the pandemic are strongly related 
to old age, whereas the pandemic experience shows more as a disruption 
to daily activities and social roles and as heightened social and economic 
insecurity for the young. 
A life course frame also invites us to look beyond chronological age 
and to account for biographical and historical time. Looking backward, 
the pandemic brings to the fore how individuals have different suscep-
tibility to the virus itself and to the social and economic consequences of 
the pandemic, depending on their previous experiences – experiences 
that can also determine the short-term and long-term consequences of 
the pandemic. We are reminded to read the life course through personal 
history as well as through its intersection with social history. The ages of 
people today are a window into their historical location, which affects 
the response to and effects of the pandemic – as in the example of people 
now navigating the pandemic in their thirties, who were just a decade 
ago navigating the Great Recession during their transition to adulthood. 
Looking forward, a life course perspective also asks us to identify 
which pandemic experiences will turn into permanent scars or reor-
ientations for individuals and their families, and which will be open to 
resilience and be compensated for or even forgotten with time. Even 
more, it encourages researchers to account for heterogeneity by speci-
fying for whom there will be scarring or resilience, and to account for 
environment and policy considerations by specifying the conditions 
under which there will be scarring or resilience. 
Whether we are looking backward or forward in understanding the 
pandemic’s effects, it is important to not only probe these dynamics at 
an individual level of analyses, but also to examine them for groups, 
especially birth cohorts or social generations. In historical moments like 
this, people of different ages are branded differently, not just because 
they are in distinct developmental periods but because their lives carry 
the imprint of prior historical experiences. 
The pandemic is reshaping transitions and trajectories in every 
domain of life, and instigating turning points that redirect life. Many of 
these are negative, or at least challenging. The transition to adulthood, 
for example, has become longer, more variable, and risk-laden in many 
countries in recent decades. The pandemic is likely to heighten these 
trends through its effects on educational transitions, youth labor mar-
kets, chances for regional mobility, family formation, and general trust 
in the future. Likewise, at the other end of working life, the transition to 
retirement may become more difficult due to insecure pensions or 
insufficient savings or assets, just as leisure and volunteering activities 
or the grandparent role may become more difficult due to limited 
mobility or concerns about exposure to Covid-19. Indeed, throughout 
the life course, the age-based rhythm of many transitions may loosen in 
the face of uncertainty and de-standardize life trajectories. 
Some changes associated with the pandemic are positive and have 
direct relevance for life course analysis, interventions, and policies. The 
pandemic is raising awareness that experiences across life domains such 
as health, family, work, and education are highly interrelated, and that 
these spheres are overlaid with institutions that have different time- 
based expectations and rhythms. It is bringing newfound recognition 
that people and places both near to and far from us are linked in 
fundamental ways that must be made more visible. Ironically, just as the 
pandemic has isolated people from one another, it also seems to be 
fostering a sense of collective solidarity, community action and coop-
eration, and the inherent need for mutual support. It is exposing in-
equalities in life course processes and outcomes, differentially affecting 
groups based on age, gender, race and ethnicity, social class, and other 
social categories. It is increasing consciousness that stability in human 
life is fragile and dependent on social institutions – and on governments 
and policies – that are nimble, work well together, and address vul-
nerabilities and systemic inequalities in the life course. In many soci-
eties, these conditions are not met. It is challenging assumptions about 
the organization of the life course and opening opportunities for inno-
vation and flexibility. 
Broadly, the pandemic is triggering deep tensions in human experi-
ence that frame how the life course is understood by the individual 
members of any society – tensions related to individualism and collec-
tivism, autonomy and interdependence, freedom and control, rights and 
responsibilities, among others. Perhaps the most profound axiom of 
modernity that is being undermined by the pandemic is that of pre-
dictability. The uncertainty and disruption it has created mimics a much 
earlier age, when time and life itself could not be counted on and when 
aspirations were more limited and planning less possible. 
One thing is sure: There is a time before Covid-19 and a time after it. 
This watershed moment is marking the psyches and lives of individuals, 
families, and cohorts in ways both known and unknown. A life course 
perspective is necessary to bring these effects, and the mechanisms that 
create them, into focus for investigation and intervention. 
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